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ABSTRACT
Historically, the Soviet Union has had important 
political interests in securing hegemony in Eastern Europe. 
Control of this region has allowed the U.S.S.R. to maintain 
a buffer zone as protection from Western influence.
The Soviets created Comecon in 1949 to aid in the 
control of the bloc. Through Comecon ties, a relationship 
built on Eastern European economic dependence on the Soviet 
Union was formed.
This economic dependency was created and maintained 
through the use of bilateral barter and inconvertibility of 
currencies within Comecon. Although these methods proved to 
be economically inefficient, the Soviets resisted any 
attempts at reform. The Soviets feared that the economic 
dependency of Eastern Europe would be lost through 
multilateralism and convertibility. The preservation of 
bilateralism and inconvertibility within Comecon therefore 
ensured Soviet political domination of the region, an 
important goal of Soviet policy in the Cold War era.
v
COMECON:
ITS FUNCTION AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT
2Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) 
was created by the Soviets in 1949. Its ultimate purpose 
was political, not economic: consolidation of the Soviet
bloc. The Soviet aim was to strengthen its buffer zone 
through increased economic ties with the Eastern European 
nations. This buffer zone, devised by Stalin, was to serve 
as protection from Western invasion and influence.
Historically, the Soviet Union has had important 
political interests in Eastern Europe. Control of this 
region has been a principle security goal of the Soviets. 
This has been particularly significant in the post-World War 
II era, characterized by the Cold War rivalry between the 
Soviet Union and the United States.
The stated purpose of Comecon was the coordination of 
the foreign trade and national plans of its members. Intra- 
Comecon trade had been based traditionally on 
inconvertibility and resulting bilateral settlement as 
established by the Soviets. Such bilateralism forces a 
country to settle trade with each of its trading partners on 
an individual basis, resulting in a barter-like system of 
exchange. This method was maintained by the Soviets as it 
served their political purpose of maintaining control of the 
region through economic domination.
This type of trade has been characterized by economic
inefficiency. Such methods have served as obstacles in the 
productive functioning of Comecon and, as many argue, has 
been a major factor in the dissolution of this organization 
in early 1991.
Despite many Eastern European efforts to incorporate 
multilateralism into the workings of Comecon throughout its 
history, such reform efforts were sidetracked or halted by 
the Soviets. This reluctance to allow the introduction of 
market mechanisms within Comecon, stemmed from the Soviet 
Communist Party's long-standing political interests in 
maintaining political and ideological control over both 
Eastern Europe and its own country.
I. Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe
In the post-World War II era, Soviet interest in 
Eastern Europe largely stemmed from past Soviet 
vulnerability to invasions through the Eastern European 
nations, specifically through Czechoslovakia and Poland.1 
As a result, one of Stalin's main concerns was to secure 
control over this territory in order to prevent future 
aggression against the Soviet Union.
A secondary interest in securing control of Eastern 
Europe, was to limit nationality and religious conflicts in
1Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The
Great Challenge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1988), 18.
4the region which' had threatened Soviet security in the 
past.2 Such historical conflicts had involved Russia 
throughout both its pre- and post-Revolutionary periods. 
Examples particularly critical to Soviet national security 
include the support given by Czechoslovakia’s first 
president, Tomas Masaryk’s to the White Russian attempt to 
overthrow Lenin and the open engagement of the Red Army in 
1920 by the Poles.3
Consequently, Soviet influence in Eastern Europe was to 
serve both to prevent Western expansion into Soviet 
territory and to stabilize the area in order to minimize 
regional conflicts and instability.4 
Stalin and the Creation of Comecon
After World War II, the Soviet Union attempted to 
extend its policy of national autarky and economic isolation 
to the Soviet bloc as a whole. Each country was aided in 
developing foreign trade institutions based on the Soviet 
model of state monopolies.
Following their refusal of Marshall Plan assistance 
from the United States in 1947, the Soviets organized their 
own Molotov Plan for the countries of Eastern Europe.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Ibid, 19.
5Between 1947 and 1955, the economies of Eastern Europe 
became tied to the Soviet economy through a series of 
bilateral trade and scientific-technical cooperation 
agreements.5
In addition, the Soviets presented the rouble as the 
clearing currency for the bloc and extended trade credits to 
the bloc states.6 Such credits were extended largely 
according to political criteria, in that often they were 
offered as a reward to nations for their loyalty to the 
Soviet Union.7 These economic arrangements served to 
establish strong economic ties between the Soviet Union and 
the countries of Eastern Europe on a strictly bilateral 
basis. The bilateral ties among the European members of the 
bloc were much weaker due to the smallness of their 
economies and similarity in products created.
By modeling the Eastern European political systems 
after the Soviet communist system, Stalin established 
uniform and favorable conditions for the political 
cohesiveness of the region. Yet, in the customary sense, 
this region was particularly unsuited for economic
5Glen Alden Smith, Soviet Foreign Trade: Organization,
Operations, and Policy, 1918-1971 (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1973), 27.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., 200.
6integration in that it lacked the precondition that 
cooperation between states be on an equal footing.8 This 
condition is necessary because the alternative, different 
levels of development would call for a number of different 
economic policies within one regional organization, which 
would be extremely difficult to achieve.9
This inequality between the bloc states can be seen in 
the diversity of development stages existing in the region. 
One measure which illustrates this is the nations' varying 
levels of per capita industrial output at the beginning of 
Comecon. In 1950, compared to the Soviet Union (the base of 
100%), Bulgaria's per capita industrial output was 43%, 
Czechoslovakia's was 14 3%, the GDR's was 13 6%, Poland's 
stood at 70%, Romania's was 31%, and Hungary's was 78%.10
Despite the varied economic composition of the region, 
Stalin still chose to create Comecon in an effort to propel 
limited economic cooperation. According to Adam Zwass, the 
lack of the precondition of equality was actually in 
Stalin's favor in that he never planned for Comecon to serve
8Adam Zwass, The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance:
The Thorny Path from Political to Economic Integration 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), 14.
’ibid., 11.
10Ibid., 10.
7as a supranational economic authority.11 The last thing 
Stalin wanted was to create an institution which had power 
over to the Communist Party within the Soviet Union.
A more immediate impetus to Stalin*s creation of 
Comecon arose when several Communist leaders in the Eastern 
European nations announced their intention to create a 
Balkan or Eastern European association independent of the 
Soviet Union. This challenge to Soviet hegemony can be seen 
in a June 1947 speech by the Yugoslavian leader Tito. 
Speaking to Western correspondents in Belgrade, Tito urged, 
"the free Balkan peoples" to create "a strong monolithic 
entity."12 Further, after visiting Bulgaria in November of 
1947, and signing several pacts, Tito remarked that between 
the two nations "cooperation was so close that the question 
of federation will be a mere formality."13 Weeks later, 
Kostov, the Bulgarian deputy Prime Minister, who was later 
killed during the Stalinist purges, declared that events 
would lead "in the near future to the union of all south 
Slavs and to the creation of a common Slav country."14
11Ibid., 14.
12Royal Institute of International Affairs: Survey of
International Affairs, 1947-1948 (London, 1952), 175, quoted 
by Ghita Ionescu, The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern 
Europe (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 30.
13Ionescu, op. cit., 30.
14Ibid.
Additional evidence of this ambition appeared in 
January of 1949 when Bulgaria's First Secretary Dimitrov 
announced his vision of a federation made up of the Eastern 
European nations of Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, Yugoslavia 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and even Greece. This 
announcement received favorable responses from many Eastern 
European communist leaders, particularly from the Romanian 
Communist leaders and the Polish Communist Party.15 
Another supporter of this vision was Rezso Nyers, a member 
of the Hungarian Politburo, who publicly stated that such a 
coalition would be much more successful without the Soviet 
superpower included.16
The Kremlin viewed these efforts as zealous attempts to 
form a South Slav or East European federation and gain 
independence from the Soviet Union. Even more threatening 
was the potential of such an organization developing into a 
rival force to counter Soviet influence in the region. In 
view of these fears, the Dimitrov incident finally snapped 
the patience of the Soviets and an admonishing response was 
published in Pravda on 28 January 1948. This article made 
clear that the Soviet Union saw absolutely no need for such
15Ibid. , 30-31.
16Zwass, 1989, op. cit., 13.
a federation and would not tolerate the creation of one.17
To avoid such a possibility, Stalin implemented 
"people’s democracies", political systems modeled after the 
Soviet State apparatus, in every bloc state in an effort to 
create complete uniformity in the region. In addition, each 
people's democracy was ordered to amend its constitution to 
clearly state its dependency on the Soviet Union for its 
creation and continued existence.18
These East European ambitions for an independent 
federation led to a deep distrust of Eastern European 
motives on the part of Stalin. Josef M. Van Brabant argues 
that it was apparent at this time that Stalin greatly feared
that if the region was to fuse the various 
economies and bolster mutual cooperation, it might 
lead to an anti-Soviet bulwark. Indeed, joint 
efforts to come to grips with the most urgent of 
their common problems without the tutelage of the 
USSR might have undermined the long-cherished 
Soviet interest in exercising hegemony over 
Eastern Europe.19
In an effort to safeguard against this, Stalin created
Comecon to develop and implement a regional economic policy,
with the Soviet Union playing the dominant role. As argued
17Ionescu, op. cit., 31.
18Ibid. , 33.
T9Jozef M. Van Brabant, Socialist Economic Integration 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 25.
10
earlier, inequality within Comecon was important to Stalin 
in that he was strongly opposed to a regional economic 
policy in which all countries were equals. Equality could 
not be accepted, because his main objective, in his own 
words, was "to hold the satellites down, but at arm's 
length. Unreliable and westernized, they must not be 
allowed too close."20
According to many experts this fear of East European 
aspirations was also behind Stalin's opposition to outright 
annexation of these countries. One such proponent of this 
argument, V. Dedijer, contends that Stalin had the power to 
annex but lacked the motivation due to his strong distrust 
of these countries.21
This distrust also appears to be behind Stalin's 
encouragement of national autarkic policies for all the 
Soviet bloc nations. Despite his creation of Comecon,
Stalin encouraged, even forced, these countries to develop 
according to a policy of national self-sufficiency. Even 
more paradoxical was the Soviets discouragement of increased 
Comecon ties.22 As each nation pursued its own autarkic
20P.J .D. Wiles, The Political Economy of Communism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1968), 311 quoted by Van Brabant, op. cit., 25.
21V. Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost- Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 
1948-1953 (New York: Viking Press, 1979), 101 in Van Brabant,
op. cit., 25.
22Van Brabant, op. cit., 25.
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economic development, Comecon was basically a formality for 
its first few years, despite the grand intentions 
established in its charter.
Khrushchev and the Reactivation of Comecon
In the late 1950s, Khrushchev expanded the role of 
Comecon in order to implement greater socialist integration; 
something he saw as very necessary at the time. This belief 
stemmed, in part, from the formation of the rival European 
Economic Community in 1958 and from the growing realization 
that autarkic development was wasteful and inefficient.
More importantly, Khrushchev saw Comecon in the same way he 
viewed the Warsaw Pact, as a forum through which to maintain 
Soviet control of Eastern Europe, especially following the 
attempted revolutions in Hungary and Poland in 1956.23
The reactivation of Comecon was a shrewd effort by 
Khrushchev to bind each individual state economically to the 
Soviet Union to create a situation of dependence. This was 
especially important in that these nations were increasingly 
becoming divided both politically and ideologically.
Economic leverage, through a system of bilateral 
dependencies on Moscow, would effectively allow the Soviets 
greater political dominance over Eastern Europe.
[E]conomic pressure was exerted by exploiting
23J. F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1988), 146.
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Eastern Europe's dependence upon Soviet raw 
materials and energy— the Soviets provided trade 
benefits as rewards for following Soviet policy 
prescriptions and withheld supplies to punish 
defiance of Soviet preferences.24
The Soviet use of economic leverage can be seen clearly 
in the case of Poland. Following the Soviet suppression of 
the Polish October, a near-revolution in 1956, the Poles 
still showed considerable interest in foreign aid, 
particularly American aid. Also, Poland was attempting to 
shift increased exports, especially its chief export coal, 
to the Western nations.25
As a result of the economic agreements and 
specialization provisions produced at the 1958 conference 
which revived Comecon, Soviet-Polish economic relations 
intensified significantly. In 1956, these transactions 
amounted to 2,562 million roubles which then grew to 2,747 
million rubles in 1959.26 This large trade volume, in 
comparison, made the American loan to Poland in 1957 of $94 
million appear negligible, even with the exchange rate taken
24Anne Henderson, "New Realities in Eastern Europe: 
Challenges for Russia and the West," in New Thinking and Old 
Realities, eds. Michael T. Clark and Simon Serfaty, 
(Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press), 36.
25Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and
Conflict (Cambridge University Press: Harvard University
Press, 1967), 287.
26Ibid. , 288.
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into account.27
Also important was the fact that Poland was becoming 
increasingly dependent on such trade, not only because of 
its large volume, but also because of its composition.
Soviet exports supplied Poland with the majority of its 
needed imports of natural resources, something Poland was 
sorely lacking. For instance, in 1957 Poland was dependent 
on the U.S.S.R. for 100% of its oil supplies, 70% of its 
iron ore, 78% of its nickel, and 67% of its cotton.28 Even 
more important, almost half of the Polish exports to the 
U.S.S.R. in 1957 consisted of Polish machinery and 
industrial goods, which represented about one half of total 
Polish machine exports.29 These important Soviet-Polish 
economic links, established through Comecon agreements, had 
important and far-reaching effects on Poland. Polish 
leaders could not ignore the political implications of their 
economic dependence on Comecon ties and more specifically, 
on the Soviet Union as supplier of raw materials.
Through the reactivation of Comecon, Khrushchev also 
hoped to make these economic ties of dependency more 
equitable than earlier Stalinist Comecon ties based on
27Ibid.
28Ibid., 288-289.
^Ibld.. 289.
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exploitation of Eastern Europe. During Stalin’s reign 
"Moscow extracted $10-20 billion in reparations, 
administered unequal joint-stock companies to exploit local 
resources, and manipulated trade agreements to its 
advantage" in its dealings with the bloc.30
Khrushchev's move to improve the Soviet-Eastern 
European economic relationship was motivated by his desire 
to achieve a period of detente with the West, to allow the 
Soviets time to catch up to American economic and military 
superiority.31 For detente to succeed the Soviets needed 
to improve their image in the international arena and an 
important part of this was to improve Soviet-East European 
relations. Improvements in economic relations were 
attempted by Khrushchev by the establishment of more equal 
and flexible intra-Comecon ties.32
To enhance the legitimacy of Comecon, the exploitative 
economic ties were replaced by the extension of Soviet 
economic support to the Eastern bloc nations. Also, the 
Soviets attempted to create the facade of more diplomatic
30Jonathan R. Adelman and Deborah Anne Palmieri, The Dynamics 
of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1989),
159.
31Ibid., 151.
32Ibid., 157.
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cooperation in Comecon decision-making and activities.33 
To offset damage done to Soviet-East European relations 
resulting from the 1956 crises in Hungary and Poland, 
Khrushchev attempted to improve economic relations even 
further. Intra-Comecon trade and activities were expanded 
with terms of trade shifting dramatically in the East 
European countries' favor.
J.F. Brown argues, "[t]he 1956 crises and their 
aftermath cost Moscow several billion dollars in loans 
extended to distressed regimes and the cancellation of old 
debts."34 Although these changes established a more 
equitable economic order in the Soviet bloc, and thereby 
allowed the Soviets to maintain influence in the region, 
this was at a very high cost to the Soviets. Although these 
new ties were costly, Khrushchev saw them as politically 
necessary. They were apparently successful in that further 
crises in the bloc during Khrushchev's tenure were 
avoided.35
Comecon Under Brezhnev
Similar to Khrushchev's handling of Eastern Europe, 
Brezhnev attempted to avoid direct military force and
33Brown, op. cit., 448.
34Ibid., 159.
35Ibid.
instead tried to use economic, political and cultural ties 
to maintain influence in the bloc. This indirect method was 
used to repair damage done to the Soviet international image 
by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It attempted to 
use new and less costly bases of control in Eastern Europe 
as opposed to interventionist methods utilizing military 
force.36 Toward this end, Brezhnev used a strategy based 
on Soviet subsidization of Eastern Europe which actually 
turned out to be quite costly economically but avoided the 
negative effects on the Soviet international image 
associated with direct intervention.
During the 1970s, this subsidization of Eastern Europe 
cost the Soviet Union tens of billions of dollars.37 One 
study estimates subsidization to have risen from less than 
$250 million in the early 1960s to more than $10 billion per 
year in the early 1980s.38 This large increase was due 
primarily to the rapid rise in the world market price of oil 
after 1973, while the price of Soviet oil and natural 
resources sold to the Eastern European nations increased at
36Morris Bornstein and Daniel R. Fusfeld, The Soviet Economy: 
A Book of Readings (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1970), 193.
37Ibid.
38Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, Soviet Subsidization of Trade 
with Eastern Europe: A Soviet Perspective (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Institute of International Studies, 
1983) cited in Henderson, op. cit., 36.
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a much slower pace.39
An additional part of Brezhnev's strategy to improve 
Soviet-Eastern European economic relations was to allow 
greater economic experimentation in the Eastern bloc 
nations. By advocating such experimentation the Soviets 
hoped to gain political support from regimes appreciative of 
less rigid Soviet control. Also, if such experiments were 
successful, the region would become less of a drain on the 
Soviet economy.40
Brezhnev, like the Soviet leaders before him, also used 
Comecon ties as economic leverage to achieve Soviet 
political interests in Eastern Europe. This can be seen in 
the interesting fact that only the most independent-minded 
country in the region, Romania, which opposed the 
Czechoslovakin invasion in 1968, did not receive a net 
subsidy from the Soviets in the 1970s.41 Also, immediately 
following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Moscow delayed 
wheat shipments in order to secure its political 
compliance.42 Another example is Brezhnev's refusal to 
sell oil to Romania during the shortage of the 1980s. This
39Henderson, op. cit., 36.
40Adelman and Palmieri, op. cit., 193.
41Ibid. , 90.
42Ibid.
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was probably a direct consequence of Romanian leader 
Ceausescu's continuous defiance of Moscow.43 Since the 
times of the Czechoslovakian invasion and the announcement 
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, Ceausescu had built up his 
military to enable it to conduct guerilla warfare. This 
clearly was done to discourage a possible Soviet 
intervention. Ceausescu also strengthened Romania's 
political and economic ties to the West.44
As illustrated, Comecon historically was used by Soviet 
leaders as an economic tool to achieve political purposes. 
Benefits and subsidies of intra-Comecon trade, such as lower 
than world prices on Soviet goods and resources, were 
extended to the Eastern European nations largely according 
to political loyalty. In this sense, Comecon countries 
following strict Soviet policy lines received increased 
trade benefits, while countries deviating from Soviet 
policies were punished economically with the loss of trade 
benefits.
II. Functions
Such leverage could only be achieved through the 
establishment of Eastern Europe's economic dependency on the 
Soviet Union. To ensure such a dependent relationship,
43Ibid., 91.
44Adelman and Palmieri, op. cit., 289.
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certain practices and procedures were needed within the 
context of Comecon activities. This compelled the Soviets 
to set up and maintain practices within Comecon that would 
ensure this aim.
To generate maximum control of the Eastern bloc 
economies and ensure dependency, Comecon was set up by the 
Soviets to coordinate the national economic plans of its 
members and to coordinate and direct foreign trade both 
within and outside the bloc.45 The Comecon Council served 
to construct a master plan of the total foreign trade 
activity of Comecon as a whole. All individual national 
plans and agreements had to be approved by the Council, 
according to the requirements of the master plan, before 
they could be put into operation.46 In the construction of 
the master plan, top priority was given to the needs and 
requirements of the Soviet Union as the dominant nation in 
the Council.47 In this sense, Comecon planning was largely 
guided and controlled by Soviet interests.
Through the establishment of the Soviet Union as the 
dominant member of the Comecon Council, it achieved a high 
level of control over the bloc. Not only was it able to
45Smith, op. cit., 205.
‘'‘ibid., 206.
47Ibid.
20
retain a large degree of control over its own foreign trade, 
the U.S.S.R. also gained an influential role in the foreign 
trade relations of the Eastern European nations.48
The inconvertibility of Comecon currencies also enabled 
the Soviets to ensure control of the bloc was the 
inconvertibility of Comecon currencies. Such 
inconvertibility isolated the Eastern bloc economies from 
trade with the capitalist West and restricted Western 
influence in the bloc. In addition, this lack of trade with 
the West avoided the possibility of economic dependency on 
Western supplies which could seriously endanger the Soviet 
status in the Cold War. Because inconvertibility was also 
practiced within Comecon it limited the transferability, let 
alone convertibility, of currencies between its members.
This intra-Comecon inconvertibility enabled the Soviets to 
preserve bilateralism and the economic dependency it 
generated.
Another element which preserved Soviet control of the 
bloc was a system of uncoordinated exchange rates for the 
Comecon nations. This method did not allow for the 
evaluation of trade according to comparative price 
advantages across member nations and therefore isolated the 
price systems within countries from the influence of other
48Ibid., 207.
21
countries' prices for the same goods. This allowed Soviet 
leaders to maintain complete control over the pricing system 
and the foreign trade transactions within the Soviet economy 
without influence from Eastern European prices.49
Since its beginnings, intra-Comecon trade was conducted 
through bilateral agreements, as instituted by the 
Soviets.50 As a result of inconvertibility within the 
bloc, this system consisted of barter trade in which each 
country attempted to balance its trade with each of the 
other nations and not with the bloc as a whole. This 
practice of bilateral barter established a pattern in which 
the foreign trade of each of the European Comecon nations 
was dominated by links to the Soviet economy. This resulted 
from the fact that the U.S.S.R. had the largest economy and 
was richly endowed with natural resources urgently needed by 
the smaller nations.
Closer dependence, stemming from increased bilateral 
ties between the Soviet Union and the members of its bloc, 
allowed the Soviets greater political and ideological 
control over each nation within the region.51 Such
49Sandor Ausch, Theory and Practice of CMEA Cooperation, trans. 
J. Racz (Budapest, Hungary: Akademiai Kiado, 1972), 165,.
50Marie Lavigne, The Socialist Economies of the Soviet Union 
and Europe (White Plains, NY: International Arts and Science
Press, Inc., 1974), 309.
51Brown, op. cit., 448.
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dependency not only assured the Soviets of political control 
of the region, but also served to prevent the development of 
strong ties between the Eastern European nations 
themselves.52
In establishing Comecon trade and activities on the
basis of bilateralism and inconvertibility, Zwass notes,
the Soviet CMEA experts never showed any 
enthusiasm for mature monetary relations. They 
were quite well aware of the difficulties 
attendant on bilateralism, but considered them the 
lesser evil compared with multilateral trade free 
of quotas. Their centrally administered economy 
with its inherent monopoly on foreign trade and 
foreign exchange had after all been in operation 
for a quarter of a century more than in the other 
Eastern countries.53
The Soviets historically have held a strong belief in 
the importance of the economy being centrally planned, with 
political power as the controlling force. They felt that 
their economy was much more controllable under the guidance 
of the Party, without the interference of "anonymous 
economic mechanisms" contained within the capitalist 
economies.54 Toward this goal, the Soviets clearly 
favored, both domestically and in intra-Comecon trade, a 
quota-based foreign trade, with products expressed in
52Henry Wilcox Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of 
Integration (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 35.
53Zwass, 1989, op. cit., 42.
54Ibid.
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physical units, over trade expressed in variable and 
abstract monetary values.55
The Soviets viewed convertibility as "an alien 
capitalist concept" which would disturb the functionings of 
the central plans on which the Soviet economy was based.56 
Foreign trade was to serve merely as a channel for supply in 
order to support the plan. Comparative cost advantage 
evaluation was not important to this function. Bilateral 
barter served this function, without allowing foreign trade 
to adversely affect the central plan.57
Economic Inefficiencies Resulting From Comecon Functions
Although this system served Soviet political purposes 
by securing Soviet economic domination of the bloc, its 
methods were significant factors aiding in the collapse of 
Comecon. Many experts contend such methods hindered intra- 
Comecon trade and reduced it to essentially an inefficient 
system of bilateral barter.
Inconvertibility within Comecon made little economic 
sense. This practice resulted in a condition where money 
could not be used for business transactions or as a basis
55Ibid.
56Ibid. , 19.
57Ibid.
24
for the development of effective credit relations.58 
Instead, the bloc currency, the transferable rouble (TR), 
was used solely as a collective accounting unit. 
Consequently, intra-Comecon credit merely served as a 
technical instrument to achieve trade settlements.59
Largely as a result of the inconvertibility of the 
Comecon currencies, bilateral barter was the main form of 
trade between its members. Although bilateralism reduced 
foreign distortions on the internal economic plan of the 
socialist economies, it was extremely inefficient.
Bilateral barter limited the volume of intra-Comecon trade 
due to its strict requirement for equal units of trade 
between two partners.
At the urging of the Soviets in 1956, bilateral barter 
became based on long-term agreements instead of previously 
used annual agreements. This not only retained the 
inefficiency of bilateralism, but also encouraged low- 
quality production due to its long-term nature.60 This 
latter point stems from the fact that long-term agreements 
allowed enterprises to avoid upgrading the quality of their
58Adam Zwass, Money, Banking, and Credit in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe (White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1979),
160-161.
59Ibid. , 161.
60Ibid. , 310.
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products due to guaranteed, predetermined prices from their 
Comecon trading partners. In addition, bilateral barter, 
with its uncoordinated price and exchange systems, severely 
limited the exposure of the Comecon members to international 
competition and resulted in the failure of its national 
enterprises to produce competitive products for world 
markets.
This system forced Comecon nations to achieve bilateral 
trade balances with each individual Comecon country rather 
than with the bloc as a whole. This arrangement rested on 
the principle of annual equality of supply of goods and 
payments between each pair of countries. If there existed 
any disequilibrium between two Comecon nations, the debtor 
nation technically had to supply additional goods to the 
other nation the next year equivalent to the debt. The 
ability to supply additional goods the next year was 
extremely difficult for a debtor nation, especially if it 
was indebted to more than one nation. As a result, this 
clearing method served as a persistent hinderance to further 
trade on the part of the debtor nations and served to impede 
any further expansion of intra-Comecon trade. Subsequently, 
this led to a very rigid system whereby debtor nations could 
never escape their predicament and creditor nations were not 
financially rewarded.
III. Soviet Resistance to Market-Based Reform
26
In an effort to eliminate the problems associated with 
bilateral clearing, Comecon initiated a multilateral 
clearing system on which to base trade settlements in 1963. 
The International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC) was 
created to achieve this and the transferable rouble (TR) was 
introduced as a monetary unit in which payments were to be 
settled between Comecon nations. Although this currency was 
transferable between Comecon member nations, it was not 
convertible outside or even within the Soviet bloc. This 
meant that surplus TRs could not be used in exchange for 
foreign currencies outside the bloc. In addition, a Comecon 
nation could not use surplus TRs from a trade surplus with 
one Comecon nation to balance a trade deficit with another 
Comecon member.61
The introduction of the TR merely served as a 
psychological ploy by the Soviets to appease those Eastern 
European nations calling for financial reform. It served no 
actual purpose and did nothing to facilitate intra-Comecon 
trade. Trade payments between the socialist nations were 
still based on inefficient bilateral exchange agreements.62
In 1969, the possibility of introducing limited 
convertibility was discussed at the Twenty-third Session of
61,,Comecon: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone,” The Economist 13
January 1990, 46.
62Lavigne, op. cit. , 314.
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the Council. Although regional convertibility was 
considered here, the Soviets declared that the possibility 
of the TR being replaced by gold or a foreign currency was 
out of the question.63
This strong resistance to even limited convertibility 
arose from the Soviet fear that it would lead to the 
dissolution of Comecon, as the European Payments Union had 
been dissolved.64 The European Payments Union had been 
founded in 1950 by fifteen Western European nations and 
endowed with working capital by the United States. Its 
basic purpose had been to reinstate multilateralism in 
Western Europe following World War II. After it had 
achieved currency convertibility and some degree of 
multilateralism for its members, it had no further use and 
was quickly disbanded.65
Stalin certainly did not want a similar fate to befall 
Comecon after achieving even limited convertibility, since 
he needed Comecon as a tool to aid in the control of Eastern 
Europe. In addition, Stalin saw limited convertibility 
within Comecon as a first step toward full convertibility 
which would certainly reduce Eastern Europe*s dependency on
63Ibid. , 315.
‘“ibid.
65Zwass, 1989, op. cit., 19.
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Soviet economic links and increase Eastern ties to the West.
Although another attempt for the creation of a 
multilateral settlement system was included in the Comecon 
Comprehensive Program of 1971, actual implementation was 
stalled by the Soviets. Section 7 of the 1971 Program 
discussed possible improvements in currency-financial 
relations and Article 9 of this document included plans for 
the development and implementation of methods to expand the 
use of the TR for multilateral settlements by 1973 .66 Also 
contained within the Program was the idea of mutual 
convertibility of the TR and other Comecon currencies, which 
was foreseen by 1973 through IBEC channels.67
Although the Soviets had participated in the creation 
of the Program and agreed to its provisions, their 
traditional aversion to such reforms ensured that no 
progress toward these Program goals would be attained by 
1973. Since this time no progress has been made either.
The TR never achieved convertibility both within the bloc 
and outside Comecon.
During the creation and adoption of the 197 3 Program, 
the Soviets had shown mere public support for
^Franklyn D. Holzman, The Economics of Soviet Bloc Trade and
Finance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 156-157.
67Ibid. , 157.
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convertibility, while the reigning domestic opinion within 
the U.S.S.R. considered the TR to serve all of its purposes. 
The common Soviet view in 197 3 was expressed by Soviet 
Finance Minister, V.F. Garbuzov. He stated that the TR 
"performs all the basic functions of an international 
socialist currency: measure of value, means of payment,
means of accumulation."68
The late 19 60s saw a Hungarian movement for both 
domestic market-based reforms and parallel Comecon reforms, 
including decentralization and convertibility. Because the 
Soviets feared the loss of power that could come with such 
reforms they suppressed this movement within Comecon. As a 
further precaution they also attempted to limit the domestic 
reform movement within Hungary.
By suppressing this movement for convertibility, the 
Soviets hoped to avoid increased ties between the Eastern 
European states and also between these nations and the West. 
Such ties could reduce the economic dependency of the 
Eastern European nations on the Soviet Union and even 
provide them with a possible escape route out of dependent 
Comecon relations. An additional motivation for suppression 
of this movement was the possibility of Comecon reform
68V.F. Garbuzov, "The Development of Currency and Financial 
Relations of Comecon Member Nations," Soviet and East European 
Foreign Trade (Summer 1973), quoted in Holzman, op. cit., 157.
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encouraging subsequent domestic reform movements within the 
U.S.S.R.69
At the 1969 Twenty-second Council Session, the Soviet 
Comecon Secretary, Nikolai Fadeyev, announced an agreement 
recognizing the need for some type of convertibility within 
the context of Comecon. Although initially appearing to 
support this fully, Fadeyev later argued for the absolute 
necessity of gradual implementation of this reform.70 In 
the end little progress was made in the direction of even 
limited convertibility due to Soviet stalling on the issue. 
Although the Soviets had agreed initially to this reform, 
they later refused to allow its implementation. They had 
supported the reform only in an effort to avoid resentment 
from the reformist-minded nations, yet they never planned to 
allow such a reform to be instituted. This deceit channeled 
the resentment of the reformist-minded nations toward the 
openly anti-reformist nations, specifically the GDR, and 
also served to create divisions among the European 
nations.71
The Soviets did realize the inefficiency associated 
with Comecon relations and recognized the need for reform,
69Schaefer, op. cit., 7.
70Ibid., 40.
71 Ibid. , 55.
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but they argued that such inefficiency could be solved 
through operational level adjustments rather than by major 
institutional reforms, such as convertibility. They felt 
that reforms toward socialist integration in the areas of 
production, investment, and scientific-technical research 
were the necessary solutions for Comecon stagnation and 
inefficiency.72
While the Soviet Union stressed the need for scientific 
and technical progress within Comecon, it focused little 
attention on the need for improved intra-bloc trade. This 
appears to stem from the historical significance Soviet 
leaders placed on the global competition between socialism 
and capitalism, especially in the area of scientific and 
technical progress.73
Increased economic ties between the Soviet bloc and the 
Western nations, particularly West Germany, in the early 
1970s, motivated the Soviet Union to call for increased 
socialist integration within Comecon. This Eastern European 
turn to Western trade and loan agreements, primarily by the 
GDR, was especially threatening to the Soviet Union in light 
of the anti-Soviet feelings in this region prevailing
72Ibid. , 81.
^Ibid.
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following the Czechoslovakian invasion.74
Subsequently, efforts were initiated by the Soviets 
toward greater integration within Comecon. These efforts 
were solely fixed on specific cooperative endeavors. In 
fact, any proposals by Comecon members which introduced the 
combination of traditional planning development methods and 
any type of market relations processes were rejected by the 
Soviets.75
At a meeting of Comecon's Permanent Economic Committee 
in May of 197 0, no progress was made in the debate over 
reform of the financial systems of Comecon, including the 
possibility of convertibility. Here it was argued, most 
strongly by Hungary and Poland, that a developed currency 
mechanism was necessary in light of the ineffectiveness of 
Comecon's bilateral trade. These nations also felt that 
such currency reform within Comecon was necessary in order 
to support their domestic reform efforts.76
Others, notably the Soviet Union, argued that 
convertibility was not a feasible idea. The Soviets 
believed that convertibility and other financial reforrs 
would require more plan-like coordination of the market
74Ibid., 128.
^Ibid.
76Ibid. , 123.
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forces of supply and demand. This, in turn, would create a 
situation in Comecon of dependency on the capitalist 
world.77
In July of 1971, the Twenty-fifth Council Session 
endorsed the "Complex Program of the Continued Deepening and 
Improvement of Cooperation and of the Development of 
Socialist Economic Integration." This established agreed- 
upon plans for the implementation of intra-bloc 
convertibility by 1973. Additionally, the goal of 
eventually using the TR for transactions outside of Comecon 
was presented.
As with previous reform attempts, the Soviets initially 
appeared to support fully all the provisions and plans 
contained within the 197 3 Comecon Integration Program. They 
saw it as a firm commitment in the socialist movement toward 
political and ideological, as well as, economic 
integration.78 Such integration was considered by the 
Soviets to be the "logical continuation of the close and 
all-round" cooperation of the past.79 Because the overall 
plan worked toward the major Soviet interest of improved 
integration of planning, the U.S.S.R. endorsed it fully.
^Ibid., 143.
78Ibid. , 182.
^Pravda, 8 August 1971, quoted in Schaefer, op. cit., 182.
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Schaefer notes,
Thus even those aspects which had not received 
high priority in the USSR, such as financial 
reform and the development of the initiative of 
enterprises and associations, were dully 
supported.80
Yet, ultimate Soviet reluctance to implement reforms it had
initially supported was again evident. During later
discussions centering on financial reform, including the
issue of convertibility, the Soviets contended that such
changes could only be considered after a number of
substantial planning improvements had been implemented
within Comecon. This view included a Soviet argument that
the extensive development of multilateral 
coordination of plans and of production 
specialization and cooperation and the improvement 
of the organization of foreign trade links will 
create the preconditions for the extension of 
multilateral accounting and multilateral balancing 
of payments effected in transferable roubles.81
The Soviets further contended that anything less than
an extremely gradual implementation of convertibility would
be unsuccessful. Their argument claimed that
under socialist conditions convertibility cannot 
operate on the basis of free market relations 
and cannot function in the manner of the so-called 
freely convertible capitalist currencies.... The 
introduction of currency convertibility 
presupposes simultaneously solving a number of 
complex problems... problems determined by
80Schaefer, op. cit., 183.
81 Ibid.
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economic and organization preconditions....82
The possibility of convertibility with the West was 
also strongly opposed by the Soviets at this time, although 
they originally had agreed to the provision contained in the 
Integration Program calling for eventual convertibility 
outside of Comecon. According to the Soviet Minister of 
Finance, "any possibility of convertibility with the West, 
even for the transferable ruble, which would involve Western 
currencies in intra-Comecon trade," was out of the 
question.83
By initially accepting and supporting the demands for 
market-based reforms within Comecon the Soviets avoided 
incurring resentment from the Eastern European reformist 
nations. Yet they later sabotaged any efforts to implement 
such reforms that would lead to a loss in their economic 
power over the region. By rejecting all Comecon reform 
efforts involving market mechanisms, the Soviet Union was 
also rejecting any progress toward real integration of the 
Comecon economies and efficient trading methods. This 
stance illustrates the Soviet preference for inefficient 
economic methods within Comecon for the sake of Soviet
82Yu. Lonstantinov in Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, 48, November 
1971, quoted in Schaefer, op. cit., 183.
83V. Garbuzov in Izvestia, 11 September 1971, quoted in 
Schaefer, op. cit., 184.
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political control rather than a more economically efficient 
Comecon through the use of convertibility and 
multilateral ism.84
During the 1970s and 198 0s, the introduction of market 
mechanisms into Comecon was discussed even more 
enthusiastically than in previous times. These discussions 
were primarily at the urging of Hungary and Poland. These 
nations advocated reform programs which included 
convertibility of the rouble, along with changes such as 
decentralization, and price reforms.85 Such changes were 
necessary to support domestic reform efforts such as 
Hungary's New Economic Mechanism program. Yet, as with 
previous attempts, these reform efforts were terminated by 
the Soviets since they were incompatible with their 
political objectives.86
IV. Gorbachev's Era of Reform
After coming to power in 1985, First Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev's main objective was to reform the ailing Soviet 
Union. A primary component of his reform movement was his 
program of perestroika, (restructuring), aimed at rescuing 
the failing Soviet economy. Perestroika included five major
^Brown, op. cit., 148.
85Ibid. , 153.
^Ibid.
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elements directed at improving the Soviet socialist system. 
These included programs aimed at decentralization, the self- 
financing of enterprises, a reformed price system, increased 
private enterprise, and democratization.87
For perestroika to succeed the Soviets needed Western 
credit and technology. To gain aid from the West the Soviet 
Union had to improve its international image. An important 
step toward a more conducive international environment to 
bolster Soviet economic recovery was the improvement of 
Soviet-Eastern bloc relations.
To improve intra-bloc relations Gorbachev encouraged 
increased economic independence for the Eastern European 
nations and the implementation of national economic reform 
within these countries.88 Not only would this improve the 
Soviet image in the eyes of the West, but by motivating the 
region to become more economically efficient, it would 
become less of a burden on the Soviet economy.
Through the encouragement of both economic and 
political reform in the region, Gorbachev allowed the 
socialist states to practice self-determination. Under this 
new Soviet policy, remarkable and unprecedented changes took 
place in the bloc during the democratic revolution in the
87Daniel Ford, "Rebirth of a Nation," New Yorker 28 March 
1988, 74-75.
^Brown, op. cit., 239.
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fall of 1989.
At that time, two of the bloc nations, Hungary and 
Poland underwent radical domestic reforms. Both countries 
aimed at rapid transitions to market economies in hopes of 
saving their ailing economies. Czechoslovakia also 
experienced economic changes toward marketization, although 
to a lesser degree and at a more gradual pace. The majority 
of the other Eastern European nations followed the Soviet 
lead and implemented limited economic reform toward market 
socialism. They generally felt that socialism could be 
maintained with slight modifications, and favored gradual 
reform.89
Ironically, such national reform efforts inspired by 
Gorbachev within the bloc nations aided in the demise of 
Comecon. Because the various reform efforts were 
uncoordinated they differed substantially across the bloc 
countries. As a result, disharmony replaced the 
historically uniform foreign trade sectors of its members. 
This uniformity was necessary for the effective functioning 
of Comecon trading and consequently, intra-Comecon trade 
became even less efficient.
Motivated by these national economic reforms and their
89Jeffrey Sachs, "Poland and Eastern Europe: What Is To Be
Done?" in Foreign Economic Liberalization, eds. Andras Koves 
and Paul Marer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 236-237.
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impairment of effective Gomecon relations, the Forty-third 
Council Session, held in 1987, proposed a parallel reform 
program for Comecon. This program included provisions for 
radical reform of the policies, instruments, and 
institutions of Comecon. Most interesting was the fact that 
the Soviet Union, in an apparent reversal of policy, was the 
strongest proponent of this program.
Reforms suggested by the majority of its members, most 
notably the Soviet Union, included a broadly-agreed goal of 
revising key mechanisms of planning, monetary, and financial 
cooperation. Despite the broad agreement for the necessity 
of such reforms, members could not agree on a number of 
economic issues related to the specifics of designing and 
implementing such changes. Controversy focused on the 
critical issues of limited regional currency convertibility, 
a revised price-setting mechanism, and the specific role of 
capital movements within Comecon.90
Progress toward resolving these controversies was 
achieved at the Comecon Session in January 1990. Here three 
market reforms intended to improve Comecon efficiency were 
agreed upon and officially adopted. These reforms included 
measures to conduct trade in convertible currency beginning 
in 1991, and a revision of the cooperation system to be
90U.N. Bureau of Economic Affairs, World Economic Survey, 
1988 (NY: U.N. Publications, 1988), 118.
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prepared.91 The third reform which called for the 
application of world prices to Comecon trade without 
traditional time lags would do away with the "Moscow 
principle." This principle had established the setting of 
Comecon prices according to annual adjustments based on the 
average world price of the previous five years.92 As a 
result intra-Comecon trade became based on distorted prices 
that had no accurate relation to world prices.
Despite general agreement for adoption of these 
reforms, a minority of the Comecon members, namely Hungary, 
Poland, and Czechoslovakia, instead called for the demise of 
Comecon. Although these reforms would eventually improve 
the economic potentials of all the member states over the 
long-term, these Eastern European nations felt that this 
reform program was not enough. Although beneficial in some 
regards, these reforms would not enable Eastern Europe to 
escape its historical economic dependency on the Soviet 
Union. The Soviets, on the other hand, called for the 
survival of Comecon under these reforms along with a new 
plan for price setting. The new price system would require 
Comecon prices to be based on current world prices and to be
91 "Assessment of the Economic Situation and Reform Process in 
the Soviet Union," European Economy, (December, 1990), 62.
92Martain Schrenk, The CMEA System of Trade and Payments: 
Today and Tomorrow (Washington, DC: The World Bank, January
1990), 61.
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calculated according to a new accounting system utilizing 
convertible currencies.
As illustrated above, the unilateral national reform 
efforts in the bloc both necessitated and served to impede 
efforts toward Comecon reforms which, at the time, were very 
necessary for its survival. Because each nation was at a 
different stage of domestic reform and was pursuing 
differing goals, the Comecon members found it difficult to 
agree on a strategy for Comecon reform that was satisfactory 
to all.
In the face of such strong demands for an end to 
inefficient Comecon relations, the Soviet Union finally 
supported financial and monetary reforms toward market 
mechanisms. Because the continuation of Comecon and its 
economic ties were contingent on such radical reforms, the 
Soviets acted to dramatically reverse their historic stance 
to save the organization. This historic reversal in Soviet 
policy was an unsuccessful effort to save Comecon and retain 
some control of Eastern Europe in the face of growing 
cleavages within the bloc. Domestic demands for reform and 
independence from Soviet influence in the satellite 
countries posed a major threat to the bloc and the 
continuation of Comecon relations.
This attempt to save Comecon by the Soviets ended in 
failure with the termination of Comecon in 1991. The
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reforms adopted at the 1990 Council Session, including the 
introduction of hard-currency trade within Comecon in 1991, 
proved unsuccessful. This hard-currency trade reform failed 
primarily because of the Soviet lack of hard currency to 
import food and consumer goods after selling its oil and gas 
to Eastern Europe.93
The change in the Soviet position on market-based 
reform within Comecon was a case of a futile effort made 
much too late. After years of historical inefficiency due 
to inconvertibility, this Soviet change in policy to keep 
Comecon alive was not enough. By the time the Soviets moved 
to support the reformist nations, these Eastern European 
nations no longer wanted to remain in Comecon.
V. Conclusion
Throughout its history, the leaders of the U.S.S.R., 
with the exception of Gorbachev, resisted or undermined 
every attempt toward convertibility and multilateralism 
within Comecon due to important political reasons. By 
allowing such reforms, the Soviet Communist Party 
effectively would have been relinquishing control over the 
economies of Eastern Europe.
To maintain political control of the bloc, the U.S.S.R.
93"Comecon Sets Date for Dissolution," Financial Times 20 May 
1991, 2.
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retained the bilateral workings of Comecon through the use 
of inconvertibility in an effort to individually bind each 
of the members to the Soviet Union. These bilateral ties 
between Moscow and each of the Eastern European nations 
eliminated the possible formation of strong economic ties 
among the Eastern European nations which could have been 
used to gain independence from Soviet control. Through the 
dependency of each nation on the Soviet economy, the Soviets 
were able to utilize economic leverage through Comecon to 
influence the politics of this region. So, although 
multilateral trade was more efficient, the Soviets preferred 
the political gains achieved through bilateralism within 
Comecon.
In addition to the economic leverage gained through 
bilateralism, this method also shielded the Comecon nations 
from Western trade and influence. The economic isolation of 
the bloc was an important Soviet aim to avoid Eastern 
dependency on Western capitalist nations. The political aim 
of control of Eastern Europe, achieved only through the 
bilateral workings of Comecon, were the ultimate ambitions 
of the Soviet Union and allowed it to maintain its buffer 
zone and effectively challenge the West in the Cold War.
The use of inconvertibility and the resulting 
bilateralization of intra-Comecon trade allowed the Soviets 
to maintain political control of the bloc. Yet these
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methods proved to be economically inefficient and 
unsustainable over time. The Soviets, by organizing Comecon 
to achieve political aims over economic efficiency, planted 
the seeds of its destruction.
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